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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs 
WILLIAM W. MORRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
WILLIAM W. MORRIS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 14517 
This brief is submitted by Appellant William W. Morris (here-
inafter "Appellant") in response to the brief of Respondent 
Packaging Corporation of America (hereinafter "Respondent"), and 
in light of the recently decided cases of Union Ski Company v. 
Union Plastics Corporation. 548 P»2d 1257 (Utah, 1976); Cate Rental 
Company, Inc. v. Whalen & Company. 549 P.2d 707 (Utah, 1976); and 
Chevron Chemical Company v. Mecham. 550 P.2d 182 (Utah, 1976). 
Appellant submits that the foregoing cases require a reversal here-
in and emphasizes that said cases were decided by this Court subse-
quent to the trial of the instant matter, inasmuch as judgment was 
rendered herein in October of 1975, and the cited cases were de-
cided in the Spring of 1976. Copies of the referenced cases are 
attached hereto. 
REVIEW OF RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent's statement of facts in its brief is inaccurate 
and states conclusions that are unfounded and misleading, which 
an examination of the trial transcript demonstrates. For example, 
on page 3 of Respondent's brief, it is stated that after Appellant 
signed the subject guaranty, he sent it to Milt Gordon " . . . for 
transportation to Respondent's plant in Salt Lake City, Utah." 
(R. 169, i. 15-16) An examination of the record, however, indicate 
that on lines 15 and 16, Appellant testified as follows with re-
spect to the guaranty: "As I recall I either gave it or mailed it 
to Milt Gordon". Respondent therefore added its interpretation to 
the record with respect to the words "for transportation to Respon-
dent's plant in Salt Lake City" which is both wrong and misleading. 
Appellant testified only that the guaranty was given to Milt Gordon 
On the same page of the trial record, at lines 17 through 27, Mr. 
Morris states, instead, that he signed the guaranty and gave it to 
Milt Gordon with the condition that William Birkinshaw should sign 
it too. Mr. Morris did not communicate that condition to Responden 
but he did to both Mr. Gordon and Mr. Birkinshaw. He did not give 
it to "his agent" Milt Gordon, to transport it directly to PCA, 
2~ 
inasmuch as Mr. Gordon had no authorization to do so. While Mr. 
Gordon assisted Mr. Morris in overseeing his interests in Utah, 
he had no authorization either to negotiate or to sign a guaranty 
on behalf of Mr. Morris and was therefore not Morris1 agent for the 
purposes of this action brought under UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 
78-27-23(2). 
Mr. Gordon was unable to execiite the guaranty for Mr. Morris 
and he had express instructions regarding its delivery. He was 
not conducting business for Morris, but was, rather, overseeing Mr. 
Morris1 investment in the cookie factory as were "Mr. Birkinshaw 
and the other people at the Draper plant.11 (R. 168, jL. 16-19) It 
is therefore clear that, if anything, a limited agency existed per-
taining only to the delivery of the guaranty and the overseeing of 
Morris1 investment. It was not Appellantfs intent that the guaranty 
reach Respondent until and unless Mr. Birkinshaw signed it and Mr. 
Gordon had no power to bind Mr. Morris contrary to his instructions. 
The record clearly reflects this intent and Mr. Gordon's position, 
even though Respondent has confused the facts in its brief. 
DISCUSSION 
As previously indicated, the Utah Supreme Court cases decided 
subsequent to the trial of the instant matter and the preparation of 
Appellant's opening brief require a reversal herein because the trial 
court permitted the improper extension of jurisdiction over the 
-3-
Appellant. Respondent's efforts to distinguish the foregoing 
cases fail inasmuch as thos efforts attempt a distinction without 
a difference. 
Cate Rental, supra, involved a Utah corporation and a Montana 
corporation who agreed by telephone to lease a front-end loader* 
Cate Rental attempted to assert long-arm jurisdiction over Whalen 01 
the following grounds: (1) that defendant had been a customer of 
plaintiff for over ten years; (2) that defendant called plaintiff 
by telephone to discuss the rental or purchase or equipment on the 
average of five times a year during each of the previous ten years; 
(3) that plaintiff would ship equipment F.O.B. to its offices in 
Salt Lake City, and defendant would pay by mail; and (4) that de-
fendant's president came to Salt Lake City in 1973 to discuss 
business dealings. Notwithstanding the on-going nature of the 
contacts, which even outnumber the contacts in the instant case, 
the Court found that the contacts were insufficient to warrant the 
imposition of jurisdiction because of the test of substantial activj 
with some degree of continuity within the state where it appeared. 
549 P.2d at 708. 
Respondent distinguishes Cate from the present case on the 
ground that the Appellant visited the state four times in two years, 
that Milt Gordon who oversaw certain of Appellantfs interests was 
present in the state and that Appellant made telephone calls to 
parties in Utah approximately once a week for about two years. 
•4-
In comparing the two cases, it is submitted that the distinctions 
do not hold up. In the nrespnt matter, Appellant made telephone 
calls to Utah approximately once a week for about two years, and 
*-
n
 Cate« defendant made five telephone calls a year over ten years* 
Apparently, Respondent would have this Court hold that one hundred 
telephone calls are sufficient to subject one to the Court's juris-
diction but fifty telephone calls are not. This is not a meaning-
ful distinction. More relevant than this is the fact that in Cate. 
the contacts followed a regular ten year course, yet in the instant 
case the same kinds of contacts lasted over a period of only two 
years. In both cases, defendants entered the State of Utah. In 
Cate, the purpose was to discuss business dealings. Here, it was 
also to discuss business dealings, but not to discuss the guaranty 
in question. This guaranty was first mentioned by one of Respon-
dent's employees by telephone to Appellant in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
and it was later sent to Las Vegas where it was signed. It was 
never discussed between them in Utah. (Respondents Brief, p. 30; 
R. 99, 110) 
It should also be pointed out that in CateT a corporation had 
been conducting F.O.B. business involving heavy equipment in Salt 
Lakes City for ten years. Here, we have a private citizen who exe-
cuted a guaranty in Nevada. Admittedly, Mr. Morris did have some 
business interests in Utah. He had an "agent11 in Utah to assist 
5 
him in overseeing those interests. Respondent astutely points out 
that no claim of lack of jurisdiction could be asserted if Respon-
dent were suing Hawkeye Investment, a Nevada corporation, in the 
State of Utah, inasmuch as Hawkeye was conducting business in Utah 
and meets all of the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Hill 
v. Zale Corporation, 25 U.2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971), (Respondent1 
Brief, p. 6) What Respondent neglects to articulate is that it is 
not suing Hawkeye Investment, it is suing Mr. Morris, an individual 
on the guaranty signed by him in NeVada. Mr. Morris1 business for 
the purposes of the Utah long-arm statute was, if anything, the 
signing of guaranties, not the baking of cookies. This business wa 
conducted by Mr. Morris in Nevada. He had no agent empowered to 
sign guaranties for him in Utah. Mr. Morris1 contacts with the 
State of Utah fail to satisfy any of the seven criteria set forth 
in Zale. supra. He had no local address or telephone, no employees 
no advertising, no bank account, etc. His activities were not what 
the courts have termed "continuous and systematic11; the guaranty wa 
executed in Nevada, and Respondent could easily establish jurisdict 
over Morris in Nevada. The jurisdictional requirements are there-
fore lacking. 
Cate is controlling, the contacts with Utah in Cate, while not 
quite as numerous as those in the present case, were as substantial 
and demonstrated a much stronger continuity than those found here. 
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On the basis of Gate, the opinion of the lower court should be 
reversed on the ground that that court lacked the proper basis for 
asserting jurisdiction over Appellant. 
The second Utah Supreme Court case bearing on the jurisdic-
tional issue is Union Ski Co.% supra, decided by this Court on 
March 31, 1976. It involved an attempt by a Utah corporation 
("Ski") to dssert long-arm jurisdiction over a California corpora-
tion ("Plastics") in a suit for breach of contract. The Utah con-
tacts as enumerated in Plastics' brief, pages 7, 8 and 9, were as 
follows: 





Dec 1, 1973 
December 1973 
From the spring of 1973 until Dec. 1973 
"Brent C. Hall was General Sales Manager 
for Miller Ski of Orem, Utah 
Plastics CONTACTED Brent C. Hall in the 
summer of 1973 and commenced negotiations 
with Miller Ski for the manufacture of a 
plastic ski boot Plastics designed 
Hall instructed Miller Ski Distributor 
to ship boots currently used by Miller 
Ski to Plastics 
In November Earl Miller owner of Miller 
ski rejects project and Miller-Plastics 
negotiations cease 
Brent C. Hall becomes part-time employee 
for Miller Ski and forms new company 
Sports Industries, Inc in Utah 
Plastics commences negotiations with 
Sports by telephone 
-7-
Dec 28, 1973 Plastics general manager comes to Utah 
with a proposed written contract for 
Sports to distribute Plasticfs boot. 
No agreement is reached 
Jan 4, 5 1974 Plastics general manager comes to Utah 
on January 4 & 5 to negotiation (sic) 
contract. Plastics denies contract was 
"executed" January 5 but admits perform-
ance commenced 
Jan 11 1974 Plastics while in Utah hire Utah artesian 
(sic) to work on boot. Messiers (sic) 
Wight Jr. & Sr. of SLC are hired 
Hab 6-11, 1974 Sports Industries forms Union Ski Company 
Partnership; hires sales force; prints 
sales literature; plans national sales 
"kick-off" meeting 
Jan 11, 1974 Plastics general manager speaks at "kick-
off" meeting for about two hours (tape re-
corded by Sports for future meetings) abou 
boot and how to sell it to customers. Lit-
erature about Plastics corp. organization 
distributed 
Jan 15, 1974 Plastics negotiates $25,000.00 check from 
Sports Industries which states on check: 
"initial payment on agreement dated Jan. 5 
1974" 
Jan. or Spring Plastics general manager meets with Utah 
1974 bank to establish joint account with Ski 
as part of financing plan. Account was 
not opened at that time as it was not yet 
needed 
Feb 13, 1974 Union Ski is Incorporated & assumes con-
tract rights 
Jan 18 & Ski commences trips to Calif, to review 
Spring 1974 progress of production; various trips were 
made on different dates 
-8-




April 5, 1974 
April 30, 1974 
Unknown 
Plasticfs employee, Allan Kinder, comes to 
Utah to discuss design and products problems 
Plastics general manager attends several 
ski industry trade shows to help staff Union 
Ski's sales booth & distribute literature 
about his company & their manufacturing of 
boot 
Artesian (sic), Franks Riggs, is hired by 
Plastics to do work on the project in March 
and in April Plastics general manager comes 
to Utah td review his work on the project 
General Manager of Plastics writes report 
to his superiors and acknowledges receipt 
of $218,000.00 worth of orders from ski 
the January 5, 1974 agreement is amended 
sometime in the spring of 1974 and several 
Signatures were placed on the agreement on 
$ome unknown day 
In Union Ski« this Court sustained the lower court in its 
finding that the proper basis for long-arm jurisdiction was lacking, 
holding that notwithstanding the above facts, it had not been demon-
strated that defendant engaged in activities in Utah sufficient to 
render it subject to the court's jurisdiction. 
Reviewing the facts in the present case, we find them strikingly 
similar but with a few significant differences. Similarities include 
the facts that: Morris was in Utah four times, at which times he 
visited Hawkeye Investment's plant; business negotiations were con-
ducted by mail and telephone; a contract was signed out of state; 
and the enforcement of the contract was subsequently attempted In 
-9-
Utah courts. A difference between this case and Union Ski is 
found in the fact that while Morris was in Utah, he at no time 
visited Respondent^ plant, nor were any negotiations conducted 
in Utah between Morris and PCA regarding the guaranty which is 
the subject matter of this lawsuit. These negotiations took 
place while Morris was in Nevada, his state of residence. While 
Hawkeye had numerous contacts with PCA in Utah in the course of 
its business of making cookies, Mr. Morris had none. His sole 
contact was with regard to the guaranties. His "business11, so to 
speak, with PCA was the making of guaranties, and the guaranty 
over which this controversy arose was negotiated and executed In 
Nevada. Sufficient contacts upon which to base long-arm juris-
diction over Mr. Morris in a suit by Respondent are therefore 
lacking. Another difference will be found in the fact that Union 
Ski involved a foreign corporation's contacts with the State of 
Utah while in this case we are dealing with an individual non-
resident looking out for his own interests. He had business intere 
within the State of Utah which he personally looked after during 
his periodic visits to the state and through Milt Gordon, who 
assisted him in overseeing these interests, but these interests 
are not the subject matter of this lawsuit. The subject matter 
of this lawsuit is the guaranty signed by Mr. Morris in Las Vegas. 
As to this guaranty, he had neither the requisite contacts with 
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the state nor an agent empowered to negotiate it or execute it 
in the state. Union Ski can indeed be distinguished from the 
present case, but any meaningful distinction cuts against the 
finding of long-arm jurisdiction, not in favor of it. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Union Ski cites the United States 
Supreme Courtfs warning against too extended an application of the 
recent decisions by that Court on long-arm jurisdiction. 548 P.2d 
at 1258. Such a case is presented here where the activities en-
gaged in by Appellant relative to the guaranty which is the sub-
ject matter of this suit are not sufficient activity and do not 
reflect the degree of continuity required by Union Ski. Union Ski 
is controlling in this case, it represents the law regarding long-
arm jurisdiction in Utah. Under Union Ski, jurisdiction should 
be found lacking in the present case inasmuch as Respondent failed 
to show that Appellant's contacts with the State of Utah were suf-
ficient to confer the right to assert jurisdiction over him in the 
courts of this state and that jurisdiction cannot better be found 
elsewhere. 
Mecham is the third and most recent Utah Supreme Court case 
dealing with long-arm jurisdiction. Mecham was a suit in Utah on 
a judgment granted against Mecham, a Utah resident, by an Idaho 
District court on a guaranty executed by Mecham in Utah. 
Mecham was an officer of the Great Basin Grain Company located 
at Tetonia, Idaho, from the time of its formation until he 
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disassociated himself from the company. Mecham, as an officer 
of said corporation, made one trip to Idaho where he discussed 
the internal affairs of the company. Two guaranty agreements 
were executed by Mecham with defendants in Utah, which guaran-
ties were subject matter of the lawsuit. The court found that 
Mecham had never asserted a business presence in Idaho and had 
no business address in that state, nor did he ever have a tele-
phone listing in Idaho. In denying the jurisdiction of the Idaho 
courts over Mecham, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the lower court 
in ruling that the Idaho courts had failed to obtain jurisdiction 
over Mecham through the Idaho Long-Arm Statute, a statute quite 
similar to the Utah statute. 
This Court in Mecham set forth five guidelines for determining 
whether a state has jurisdiction over a given defendant, which are: 
(1) the nature and quality of contacts in the forum state; (2) the 
quantity of such contacts; (3) relationship of the cause to the 
contacts; (4) interest of the forum state in providing a forum 
for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties. These 
guidelines are more or less along the lines of those set forth in 
Zale, supra. Guideline number (3) in Mecham, however, amplifies 
and clarifies the Zale criteria by focusing on the relationship 
of the cause of action to the contacts. 
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The foregoing focus is ignored by the Respondent in the 
instant case. Mr. Morris did have some contacts with the State 
of Utah. Mecham had some contacts with the State of Idaho. In 
Cate, the Montana corporation had some contacts with Utah. In 
Union Ski, Plastics, a California corporation, had some contacts 
with Utah. In each of these cases> jurisdiction was found to 
be lacking. In these cases, this Court talked in terms of the 
nature of the visits, local offices, or outlets, addresses, tele-
phone listings, etc., as examples of substantial activity and 
continuity. Much of this was aimed at establishing a relation-
ship between the cause of action and the non-resident's contacts 
with the State. This relationship was found lacking in Cate% in 
Union Ski, and in Mecham. It is also lacking in the instant case. 
There is no meaningful nexus between the activities of Hawkeye 
Investment, a corporation, in Utah and the signing of a guaranty 
by Mr. Morris, a Nevada resident, in Nevada. Mr. Morris did have 
limited contacts with Utah in his capacity of stockholder in a 
Nevada corporation doing business in Utah, but these are certainly 
less meaningful than those of Mecham with Idaho in his capacity 
of a corporate officer of an Idaho corporation. Both executed 
guaranties in the states of their residences, and in both cases 
in personam long-arm jurisdiction is lacking. 
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The only ground upon which Appellant can conceive that jur-
isdiction might be established is that of "alter ego11, but as that 
was not plead and established below and was not raised on appeal 
here, it fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent suggests that Appellant has engaged in generalities 
and has not shown specifically wherein the lower court erred. Rath 
Appellant showed specifically in its brief the points wherein the 
lower court erred and now, by this reply brief, demonstrates the 
veracity of its position in light of recent, important Utah Supreme 
Court decisions. It should be noted in connection with said de-
cisions that they were decided subsequent to the trial of the mat-
ter and that the trial court did not have the benefit thereof. 
The lower court erred in attempting to assert jurisdiction over 
Mr. Morris. Therefore, Appellant Morris respectfully requests 
that the judgment of the lower court be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul T. Moxley 
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
William W. Morris 
1320 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801-322-5614 
-14-
Certificate of Service 
The foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant William W. Morris 
was served upon Respondent Packaging Corporation of America 
by mailing, first class and postage prepaid, two copies thereof 
to its attorney, Lauren N. Beasley, of COTRO-MANES, WARR, 
FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY, at his offices at 430 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 2 day of f^tUfjmlstA^ . 
1976. 
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GATE RENTAL COMPANY, INC. 
without sufficient merit to justify extend-
ing this decision, or to reverse the judg-
ment. 
Affirmed No costs awarded. 
ELLETT and MAUGMAN, JJ.f concur. 
TUCKETT, J , dissent*. 
HENRIOD, C J.f does not participate 
herein. 
O { U* NUMMt t l t t l * ) 
^ » • < >n~ii<~n i f ' ^ t*r 
CATE RENTAL COMPANY, INC* 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
WHALEN &. COMPANY, Deftndtnt 
and Respondent. 
No. 14292. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
May 5, 1070 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Marccllus K Snow, J., quashed at-
tempted service on foreign corporation, 
and plaintiff Utah corporation appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J , held that 
where lora&n corporation in connection 
with leasing and purchasing hca\y con-
ftruction and mining equipment had called 
Utah corporation on a\crage of fi\e tunes 
p year for past ten years, Utah corporation 
(shipped equipment f. o. b and billed for-
eign corporation which paid by mail, and 
particular transaction was entered into by 
telephone call m customary manner, foreign 
corporation engaged in insufficient activi-
ties within Utah to subject it to jurisdiction 
under Utah long-arm statute. 
Affirmed, 
Maughan, J , filed dissenting opinion. 
Y. WHALEN & COMPANY Utah 7 0 7 
P M 707 
1. Courts O I 2 ( 2 ) 
Long 'inn statutory requirement of 
"transaction of business within the state" 
is that defendant has engaged in some sub-
stantial aetmty with some degree of conti-
ruiit> within Utah. U C A.1953, 78-27-* 
2. Corporations 0>665(1) 
Where foreign corporation in con: ec-
tion with leasing and purchasing hea\y 
construction and mining equipment had 
called Utah corporation on average of five 
times a >ear for past ten years to discuss 
rental or purchase of equipment, Utah cor-
poration would then *hip equipment f o b . 
and bill foreign corporation which paid b> 
mail, foreign corporation's president had 
been in Utah to discuss business dealings 
on one occasion in 1973, and particular 
transaction had been entered into b\ tele-
phone call in custom iry m inner, foreign 
corporation had engaged in insufticienr ac-
tivities to subject it to jurisdiction under 
Utah long-arm statute U.C A 1953, 7S-
27-5 
R CpflnT" Mangrum/of Christenscn, Gar-
diner, Jensen & Evans, Salt Lake Cit\, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Dean I Conder, Stephen L. llcnnod, of 
Nielsen, Conder, llennod & Gottfredson, 
Salt 1 ake City, for defendant and respon-
dent. 
CROCK CTT, Justice* 
Plaintiff, Catc Rental Co, appeals from 
the granting of a motion to quash attempt-
ed service of summons upon defendant 
Whalcn &. Co, of Montana, under the 
long-arm statute.1 
1 roin its Salt I ake I ity business, plain-
tiff, a Utah corporation, sells and rents 
heavy construction and mining equipment 
to customers in this state and thiemghout 
the intcrinountain area. Since 1**62 elc-
fendant has been one of its customers m 
leasing and purchasing some of its equip-
ment. This particular suit arose out of an 
I Se«tioii 78-27-5, U.C.A IftM. 
7 0 8 Utah 549 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
agreement by a telephone call from the de-
fendant in Montana to lease a front-end 
loader which was shipped to defendant's 
Montana job site in accordance with the 
defendant's instructions. Thereafter a dis-
pute (detail not material here) arose be-
tween the parties and the plaintiff initiated 
this suit. 
The activities relied on by plaintiff to 
give the Utah court jurisdiction arc set 
forth in its brief\ Yhat defendant called 
plaintiff by telephone and discussed the 
rental or purchase of equipment on the 
average of five times a year for the past 
ten years. Plaintiff would ship the equip-
ment f. o. b. its offices in Salt Lake City, 
and bill defendant, who would pay by mail. 
This particular transaction was entered 
into by a telephone call in the customary 
manner; and further, the defendant's pres-
ident, jerry Whalcn, was inSal t Lake City 
to discuss their business dealings on one 
occasion in 1(>73. "" 
The trial court agreed with the defend-
ant's challenge to the Utah court's jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the foregoing fact* 
did not show sufficient activities or busi-
ness presence within the state of Utah to 
subject it to the jurisdiction of our courts. 
[1] It is our opinion that fairness and 
good conscience demand that we accord to 
citizens of other states who desire to make 
purchases here, or who may visit here or 
engage in any kind of transitory transac-
tions, the same protections from possible 
harassment by long distance lawsuits as we 
expect to be accorded our citizens in simi-
lar circumstances in our sister states. Ac-
cordingly, the requirement of the statute of 
the "transaction of business within this 
state" is that the defendant has engaged in 
some substantial activity with some degree 
of continuity within our state. 
[2] This case is very similar in perti-
nent aspects to the recently decided Union 
Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 
1257 (Utah, 1976), in which wc affirmed 
the trial court's dismissal for lack of juris-
diction of a suit for breach of contract by 
a Utah corporation against a California 
corporation. A comparison shows that the 
defendant here had even less activities 
within this state upon which service under 
the long-arm statute could properly be 
based. The principles set forth in the t/w-
ion Ski case are controlling here. 
Affirmed. Inasmuch as defendant has 
not submitted itself to the jurisdiction of 
our court to ask for affirmative relief, no 
costs are awarded. 
HKNRlOt) , C. J., and E L L E T T and 
TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting): 
The reasons for dissent are adequately 
stated in my dissenting opinion in Union 
Ski Company v. Union Plastics Corpora-
tion, 54S I\2d 1257, (Utah, 1976), to which 
reference is made. 
Appropriate also is the following state-
ment from 27 A.L.RJd, Jurisdiction Over 
Nonresident, Section J, page 418: 
However, it can be stated 
safely that in most jurisdictions the trend 
is toward expanding jurisdiction over 
nonresidents. It has been said that this 
trend toward liberality is creative of a 
"minimum contact" rule as prerequisite 
to the exercise of power over nonresi-
dent defendants. 
Under statutes predicating jurisdiction 
on the transaction of "any" business or 
merely on "transacting business," it has 
been held that the volume of business 
done by the nonresident in the forum 
state is not the only method by which 
the necessary contacts can be established. 
Moreover, the courts have recognized a 
distinction between activities of a for-
eign corporation which will bring the 
, corporation within the jurisdiction of the 
local courts, and activities necessary to 
subject the foreign corporation to do-
mestication. 
This latter distinction, I believe, we hav< 
not made; and, in not doing so, have sad-
dled residents with burdens not anticipated 
by our statute. 
UNION SKI COMPANY v. UNION PLASTICS CORPORATION Utah 1 2 5 7 
Cite a* r>!8 V .M U 
UNION SKI COMPANY, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UNION PLASTICS CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 14065. 
MintH wo Court of I tah 
March 31, 1070 
Utah corporation brought action 
against California corporation to recover 
for damage allegedly suffered b( cause of 
defendant's breath of contract rditing to 
plan for defendant to manufacture ski 
iKKJts The I ourth District Court, Utah 
Count), VU n B Sorenseu, J , granted mo 
Hon of defendint, which had been strved 
under the long arm statute, to dismiss for 
Uck of jurisdiction over it diu\ plaintiff 
appealed The Supreme Court, C rockctt, 
J, held that plaintiff failed to show that 
defendant had engaged in activities in 
Utah sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction 
of Utah courts. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
1. Courts C=>I2(2) 
It is prerogative of state to set its own 
standards *cs to what contacts or activities 
vuthm state are sufticieut to meet require-
ments of long arm statute, so long as tlu> 
do not tall ht low r* quircuie fits under adju-
dications based upon provisions of Consti-
tution of United States U.C.A 1953, 78-
27-24, 7&-27~2^ 
2. Courts C=M2<2) 
Transaction of business within loug-
Arm statute requires that defendant en-
gage in some substantial activity with 
*cne degree of continuity within state 
I C A PM, 78-27-24, 7H-27-25. 
3. Corporations C=>673 
Burden was upon plaintiff suing for-
eign corporation served under long arm 
statute to affirmatively demonstrate that 
548 F 2<J—79Ct 
defend tut had trms.ietttl business within 
tin state U ( \ V*\t 7* 27 24, 7X-27-2S 
4. Appeal and Error 0>911(3) 
On appeal, Supreme ( ourt indulged 
the presumption of verity and eorrectness 
of trial eouifs determination that foreign 
Corpoiation had not transacted business in 
state so as to be subject to jurisdiction of 
Utah courts upon service under long-arm 
statute atid determiu ition would not be dis-
turbed unless plaintiff showed that it was 
an error 
5. Courts C=>I2(2) 
(•encrallv it is moie fan and logical to 
find jurisdiction m forum state when ma-
jor aspects of activitv out of which cause 
of action aris< s incur in th.it state and 
converselv, determiu ttion of jurisdiction in 
forum state is less likely to be found where 
principal activities take place elsewhere. 
U ( \ I'M, 7$ 27~3\t 78 27-25. 
6. Corporations C=^ 673 
v In suit against foteign corporation to 
recover for damage allegedly resulting 
from defendant's breach ot contract relat-
ing to plan for defendant to manufacture 
ski boots, plaintiff failed to show that de-
fendant, served under long arm statute, 
had engaged in activities m Utah sufficient 
to subject it to jurisdiction of Utah courts. 
U.C.A PM, 7X-27 24, 7S-27-2* 
J Hunt Wood, Piuvu. Dave McMulhn, 
Pa\son forplauttitt and appellant 
Douglas | Pcir), Salt Lake I it), for de-
fendant and respondent 
C ROl KI H \ Justice 
Plaintiff, Union ski Company, a Utah 
coipoiation, brought this action against de-
fendant, L nion Plasties I orporation. a Cali-
fornia corporation, to recover for damages 
alleged'y sutfered because ot defendant's 
breach of contract relating to a plan for 
defendant to manufacture ski boots De-
fendant was served as provided m section 
7H-27~2^, VL \ PM, the so called Long-
Arm Statute I rom the granting of de-
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fendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jur-
isdiction over it, the plaintiff appeals. 
In the fall of 1073, Hrent U Hall, a 
Utah resident, \isited the Union Plastics 
(Plastics) plant in California to discuss the 
feasibility of having Plastics manufacture 
a ski hoot for Miller Ski Companv, which 
then employed Mr. Hall In November, 
V>7*1, Miller abandoned the project. How-
ever, Plastics had indicated some interest 
in the plan, so Mr Hall and \iben K. Job 
ley, also a Utah resident, form* d a new 
Utah corporation, Sports Industries, Inc , 
to market the boots vvhuh Plastics would 
manufacture. The name was later changed 
to Union Ski Compan> 
Negotiations between the two firms be-
gan in November, P>73, and, on December 
2H, ln73, Arthur Fi/enberg, general man 
ager of Plastics, Came to Utah 'I he trip 
was pnmaril) a ski vacation for Mr I i-
zenberg and his fanul), but he did bring a 
proposed contract, which proved nnaeeept-
able to Ski. Mr. I izcnbe rg returned to 
Utah on January 5, V>7\, whin he nut 
with Ski An oral understanding was ar-
rived at, which was to be computed in 
typewritten form, and then executed b> the 
parties, which was not the n accomplished 
After some changes, the contract in con-
troversy hire was signed in April, 1974, b) 
Plastics in California. 
I*or Utah to at quire jurisdiction over tin 
defendant, it would have to be on the basi 
of our statute, Section 7X-27-24, U.l . V 
1953, which prov ides • 
Am person . . . who in person or 
through an agent does am of the follow-
ing enumerated acts, submits himself, 
. to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state as to any claim arising 
from 
(1) The transaction of any business 
within this state; 
I. MfOre r International f.ife Jnsur am e Co, 
3.v» r.x. irno, TS s.ct. u»<», 2 L I M I M TSI 
(]U7*7); Internatutnal Shoe Co. ? Washing 
ton, 32H U.S. ;{I0, ik> X.Ct. 151, [H> M M . *X> 
(11M5). 
{2) Contracting to supply services or 
goods in this state ; . . . 
[ 1 | It is the prerogative of this State 
to set its own standards as to what con-
taets or activities within the State are suf-
ficient to meet the requirements of that 
statute, so long as the) do not fall below 
the reepiirenu nts under adjudications based 
upon provisions of the ( onstitution e)f the 
United States, eited and reheel upon \*y 
plaiutttl1 Ne>twithstanding the averted 
tieiul toward liberality in allowing the ac-
quisition (if jurisdiction, with which this 
court is generally in agreement, it is sig-
nificant to note that in Hanson v 
J)i'9uklii* decided subsequent to those cas-
es, the Unite el States Supreme Lourt warn-
ed against too exteneleel AU application of 
those ekeisions: 
Hut it is a mistake to assume that this 
trend he iaids the eventual demise of all 
resti it tions on the* personal jurisdiction 
ot state courts (citation] Those re-
st! utions
 t\r< more than a guarantee of 
immunity from inconvenient or distant 
litigation. '1 he > are a conseepienee of 
territorial limitations on the power of 
the respective states. However minimal 
the burden e>! defending in a foreign tri-
bunal, a defendant ma\ ne*t be called 
upon to do so unless he has had the 
"minimal contacts*' with th.it State that 
tire- a pti requisite to its exercise of pow-
er e>vei him | e nations j 
* * * * * * 
[ l]t is essential is eaeh ease 
that t ime be some act hy which the e!e-
fend.uu pmposefuM) aN.ulx rtseH oi the 
privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum state, thus invoking the bene-
fits anel protections of its laws 
(citation) 3 
It is undoubted!) true that effect should 
be given to the policy declaration in our 
2 :j.vr r x . 'j:ir>% ?x s.ct. irjs. 2 L.nud 
3. id nt pp. 1*51, i»r»:{, 78 x r t . »t pp. IL\*S. 
1210. 
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statute,4 tha t the jur i sd ic t ion of our cour t s logical to find ju r i sd ic t ion in the forum 
.should be ex tended to protect the c i t izens s tate when the major aspects of the ac t iv i -
of this S ta te consis tent with concepts of ty out of which the cause of ac t ion a r i ses 
fairness and equal jus t ice under due proc- occurs in that s t a t e ; and converse ly , tha t 
c<s of law. Hut the o ther side of this com clctcnnin.i t ton of ju r i sd ic t ion in the forum 
ts that the rule of law should also protect s ta te is less likely to he found w h e r e the 
our ci t izens from suits in o the r s ta tes , un- pr incipal ac t iv i t ies ( the execu t ion of the 
lc*s they have engaged in some conduct or con t rac t , m a n u f a c t u r e of the hoots , and the 
activity the re beyond a mere casual or paymen t s the re fo r and de fendan t ' s a l leged 
transitory presence t h e r e i n ; and concomi- breach of the c o n t r a c t ) t ake place 
tantly, that the res idents of our s is ter e l sewhere . 7 
states should be given the same pro tec t ions 
. . • , [61 T h e main act ivi ty of the de fendan t 
here as we expec t our c i t izens to be a o l ' -, 
. . . relied upon by the plaint iff is tha t of Mr . 
conkd t h e r e . .. ' , ' . 
h i / e n b e r g . He visited t tali a total of 
[2] In ha rmony wi th the foregoing this four t u n e s : the two occas ions previously 
court has consis tent ly held tha t the t r a n s - ment ioned , and aga in on J a n u a r y 11, •1**74, 
idion of business wi th in the mean ing of and April 5, 1 *>7 4. On the la t te r visi ts , 
our s tatute requi res that the defendant has Mr. Ki / cnbcrg a t tended mee t ings about the 
tti^aged in some subs tant ia l act ivi ty with p lann ing of sales af ter the boots should be 
yjnie degree of cont inu i ty wi thin this manufac tu r ed , and he also inspected Ski ' s 
>tate5 In the case of / / / / / r . Zalc Corp* opera t ions . Defendan t Plast ies did pay for 
«v set forth a number of examples of ac- some work done by th ree employees select-
ivity to be examined in de t e rmin ing ed and re ta ined by Ski . Hut Plas t ics did 
whether, by reason of any one of them, or not have any business si tus by way of of-
..ny combinat ion of them, it can fairly and (ice or s tore or o the rwi se in the S ta te , nor 
reasonably be said tha t act iv i t ies of the any proper ty , inven tory , te lephone l is t ing 
foreign corpora t ion in th is S ta t e should or bank a c c o u n t ; nor do any adve r t i s ing 
subject it to the ju r i sd ic t ion of our cour t s . here . F u r t h e r , the con t r ac t on which 
f , C1 T % , u #v *i i , plaint iff relies was executed in de f endan t ' s 
[3-5] In ana lyz ing w h e t h e r the plain- ! 
• - • v /i » .i i : « behalf in C a l i f o r n i a ; it provided that all 
;it! has shown that the defendant comes * 
, . . . . ,, „• paymen t s would be made to Plas t ics ' bank 
within that requi rement , these proposi t ions * -
,rc to be cons ide red ; Firs t , the burden ; t l , c r c ' , h a t a ! 1 *!T ,u 'Mts w o l l M W Vi)M' 
.as upon the plaintiff to a f f i rmat ive ly so l a i c s ' Cal i fornia plant , whe re the shoes 
demonstrate. Second, on appeal we in- u r r c l o 1 , c 'Manufac tured ; and tha t the 
iul^t the p resumpt ion of veri ty and cor- laws of Cal i forn ia would gove rn the a g r e e -
rectr.i-ss of the tr ial cour t ' s ' d e t e r m i n a t i o n ment . 
,nd do not d i s tu rb it unless the plaint iff
 W | u . n , , | c f o r t . K < ) i l , K f a c t s a r e c o n s i ( | c r e d 
ha $ shown tha t it was in e r ro r . T h i r d , • . . . , ... r ,. . „ - •
 t t . t • . „ ,%• 
• m the light ot the pr inciples ahove d is -
•here is a fur ther pr inciple , recognized in
 n 1 s s c d a n ( l a s S1.t f o r l h i n t h c c i u . a c a s t . S f 
-.i$ area of thc law, which may be r ega rd
 u c a r c n o t p c r s u . t d c d that we should disa-
J as hav ing some bea r ing cm the tr ial ^ ree with the de t e rmina t ion made by the 
hurt's de te rmina t ion here . T h a t is, tha t it tr ial c o u r t : that it" was not shown tha t the 
» generally though t to be more fair and defendant had engaged in act iv i t ies in th is 
i S v See. 7S- -7- •*- ' . r .<\A.P>r,. '{. 1I>7J) : r*lU,],ini V. Stirhn d Si>n*, ?C2 P.1M 
i Ma< * rinanruil < orf>, r. \rraaa Motor 
Hatful* Inc., TCU [\'J,\ \2U ( T r a i l ) ; Hanks g L»r» P t a h -M .T»7. 4VJ 1V-M .'UTJ. 
r Administrator #»/ Estate of Jensen, ,%,'U I*. 
j«! :*•»*•.t ( t ' t n h VMTt) ; Transnestrm (Jeuerat 7. Moor«\ Kedernl Praet ie i - . S««e. 1.2.1 CM Kd. 
\gvti' y i*. Morgan, 5-t» I'.iM I IS<> ( I ' t u l i P.M/T), and a u t h o r i t i e s therv iu eitctl . 
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State sufficient to render it subject to the 
jurisdiction of our courts. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
UKNRIOI), C J , and FLU-TIT and 
Tl'CKKTT, j j . , concur. 
MATCH AN, Justice (dissenting): 
For the following reasons 1 dissent: 
All statutory references are to U.C.A. 
10$ J, as amended. Our statute, 78-27-22, 
declares: 
It is declared, as a matter of legisla-
tive determination, that the public inter-
est demands the state provide its citizens 
with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who 
through certain significant minimal con-
tacts with this state, incur obligations to 
citizens entitled to the state's protection. 
This legislative action is deemed neces-
sary because of technological progress 
which has substantially increased the 
flow of commerce between the several 
states resulting in increased interaction 
between persons of this state and per-
sons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure 
maximum protection to citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert 
jurisdiction over nonrcsidetit defendants 
to the fullest extent permitted by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the lTnited States Constitution. 
The statute is a remedial one, and our 
law requires it be liberally construed; to 
effect its object, and to promote justice.1 
Aside from the statute cited in the foot-
note, its status as a remedial statute re-
quires liberal construction. As was said in 
Castle r. Delta L & H\ Co.* "Being reme-
dial, the statute must be liberally con-
strued." 
I. i»H '.l 2. "Tli** rub* of fit** common law flint 
MitttircM in derogation thereof tin* to IM* strict-
ly eoiiMfrtM't) has no application to the NtHt-
l l t e * o f thtM *t l i t« \ T l lC NlMlUtCN 4'Ntllhli.sll 
tilt* Ii*W* Of tlllH HlUtl* rt*N|M»«*till)f tilt* MIlUjlM'tN 
to which they refute, ami their provisions 
Mild Aill proceedings umlcr them lire to In' hh-
erulty construed with a view to effect the ob-
The court today fails to follow this law 
in several important particulars. It fails to 
recognize the legislative determination. It 
fails to recognize significant minimal con-
tacts. If fails even to mention the obliga-
tions, viz., $25,1*1X1, inter alia, to a citizen 
entitled to this State's protection. It fails 
to recognize the -increased interaction be 
tween persons of this State and persons of 
other states. Not only does it not insure 
maximum protection to citizens of this 
State, it insures only minimal protection. 
It would appear that the statute has been 
reversed to require, maximum contacts % ith 
this State, in Order to insure minimal pro-
tection to its citizens, Patently, the statute 
is not applied to the "fullest extent permit-
ted by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment"—the construction giv-
en it not only is not liberal, but extreme!) 
restrictive. 
It is, indeed, questionable to say (as the 
court does today), it is the prerogative of 
this State to set its own standards, for in 
personam jurisdiction over nonresidents, 
when the legislature has already set the 
standards, and such jurisdiction is com 
pletely dependent upon, and limited on!\ 
by, the Federal constitution, viz., the lour 
teenth Amendment. In this connection, i* 
should not go unnoticed that the Contineii 
tal Congress, moved by oppressive st.it. 
, measures, inimical to a union of the stau» 
convened the Constitutional Convcuttt*: 
A result of which brings to our legisLtu: 
the power to set standards for in person.*?-
jurisdiction over nonresidents; to ti, 
"fullest extent of the Fourteenth Ann:.' 
merit." To hold otherwise, I believe ri;: 
Counter to the due process clause oi e . 
own Constitution by denying ih\c proces* * : 
law to one of our citizens; which t* «. 
only not denied by our Constitution, bu: 
j ec l s of the s ta tutes iithl to promote 111%' 
Whenever there is tiny variance l>t rv\••« t* * 
rules of equity ami the rules of common :.. 
in reiVrenee to the same mutter the ruh» 
equity Mhutl prevail." 
2. 58 Ftah Ki7, 111), 197 I*. 584, 5.S5 <p,«. 
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guaranteed hy the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The question hire is primarily a federal 
one, ami secondarily a state one, although 
the legislature has certainly given it prune 
importance In addition, \\c do not have 
the problem of a statute attempting to re-
strict the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
rather one which endorses its operation to 
the full. Taking jurisdiction of the facts 
in this matter would fall far short of the 
permissible limits of the fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The mobility of the economy has 
changed much since the International Shoe 
use, of 104s, and the law relating to jur-
isdiction over nonresident defendants has 
changed with it—L'tah excepted The con-
cepts dealt with here are of such impor-
tance I wish to present my view of the 
facts, and how the law is applicable to 
them 
The question on appeal is whether the 
ictivities of a foreign corporation, m dial-
ing with a Utah corporation, render the 
foreign corporation amenable to the juris-
diction of the Utah court; under the 
long-arm statute. Prior to the foreign cor-
poration's answer, it interposed a motion to 
<!IMNISS accompanied b> affidavits; the 
plaintiff submitted counter-affidavits. The 
•notion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
*as grantee! No findings were made. I 
ftould reverse and remand for a trial on 
ht merits. 
The protagonists are plaintiff-appellant, 
Union Ski Company, a Utah corporation, 
•ereafter "Ski", and respondent-defend-
int, Union Plastics Corporation, a Califor-
nia corporation, hereafter "Plastics/* 
Ski and Plastics entered into a contract, 
Mtt which a ski boot was to be manufac-
,'cd by Plastics and supplied to Ski. The 
jrtract contemplated long-range pay-
-cnts of which $25,<MX) was the initial pay-
-cnt—this initial payment was paid to 
"astics by Ski. During the negotiations, 
-a general manager for Plastics made sev-
•il trips to Utah in the intend of this 
contract, engaged toe al boot designers, or-
ganized and conducted a sales meeting for 
the promotion of the boot, personally ne-
gotiated with representatives of ski for 
the mauufaetuie, promotion and sale of 
that product Plasties also had its hand in 
the advertising of the produet and demand-
ed that its name be Used m any promotion-
al efforts 
The contract, dated January 5, P>74t con-
templated a long serres of transactions, 
with advance payments of $75,t)tH), begin-
ning with 1074, pure bases of ski l>ootsi to-
taling $o(K),<X)0 were to be made; by 1078 
a sales figure of $1,S00(IK>O was to be 
reached A memorandum by Plastics' gen-
eral manager stated that .Ski was to have 
the exclusive sales and merchandising op-
eration, in return for which the advance 
payments of $75,<HX) would be maele. By 
April of 1074, Ski had secured orders for 
the boot amounting to $218,()<M). No boots 
were supplied to Ski 
It is undisputed that Plastics received 
the $25,tiU> check, and negotiated it. It is 
not disputed th.it the contract was execut-
ed, but it is dispute el where and when it 
was executed. Ski claims that .ill signifi-
cant indicia of minimal contacts in Utah, 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the 
Utah court, oceurnel in Utah, Plastics 
(latins th.it such indicia oceurred in the 
state* of California, aiiel that no significant 
activities were earned on in the state of 
Utah by Plastics to justify the Utah juris-
diction. The conflicts in the affidavits 
themselves woulel be sufficient to rcepiire a 
trial of the issues of fact. 
Today, the court states that determina-
tion of jurisdiction in a foreign state is 
less likely to be found where the principal 
activities take place elsewhere, ami men-
tions the execution of the contract (the 
record shows complete disagreement on the 
place of execution), manufacture of the 
boot, the paym its therefor, and defend-
ant's alleged bleach of contraet. These 
points together with the assertion that one 
must maintain a business situs, execute the 
contract, make the payment* in the forum 
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state; and that all shipments should he 
otherwise than F.O.H. outside the forum 
state, were all disposed of M years ago in 
International Shoe Company r. ll'ashhia-
/on.3 There, in finding the state of Wash-
ington did have jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant, the court said: 
Appellant has no office in Washington 
and makes no contracts either for sale or 
purchase of merchandise there. It main-
tains no stock of merchandise in that 
state and makes there no deliveries of 
goods in intrastate commerce. . . . 
The authority of the salesmen is limited 
to exhibiting their samples and soliciting 
orders from prospective buyers, at prices 
and on terms fixed by appellant. The 
salesmen transmit the orders to appel-
lant's office in Saint Louis for accept-
ance or rejection, and when accepted the 
merchandise for filling the orders is 
shipped f.o.b. from points outside Wash-
ington to the purchasers within the state. 
All the merchandise shipped into Wash-
ington is invoiced at the place of ship-
ment from which collections are made. 
No salesman has authority to enter into 
contracts or to make collections. 
The "long-arm statute"4 gives us the 
l>ertment definitions. "Any person*' is de-
fined to mean any individual, firm, compa-
ny, association, or corporation. And 
"transaction of any business within this 
state" is defined to mean the activities of a 
nonresident person, his agents, or repre-
sentatives in this State which affect per-
sons or businesses within the state of Utah. 
Section 7&-Z7-24 provides: 
Any person . . . whether or not a 
citizen or resident of this state, who in 
person or through an agent does any of 
the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
3. :cu r.s. 310, w s.ot. if**, oo L.Bd. W 
U1H5). 
4. 7&-21-'22 through 28, L.Luh IDoU 
courts of this state as to any claim aris-
ing from: 
(1) The transaction of any business 
within this state; 
(J) Contracting to supply services or 
goods in this state; 
* * * * * * 
In order to'properly understand the man-
date of the legislature, \«/., that the long-
arm statute "should be applied so as to as-
sert jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants to the fullest extent permitted by the 
due process , clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the I'nited States Constitu-
tion," we must examine those decisions of 
the I'mtcd Stall's Supreme Court, deter-
mining that clause in relation to the long-
arm statutes, and related statutes, of our 
sister states. This is necessary because it 
is not contemplated, in our federal system, 
that each of fifty different jurisdictional 
enclaves be a final arbiter of the meaning 
of the federal constitution in litigation, be-
tween citizens of different states. 
One of the principles established in the 
famous case of /Ywm>\rr r. AV// f t was 
that a court could not acquire jurisdiction 
over a nonresident party, by serving proc-
ess outside the forum, or by publication. 
The first definite departure from that case 
occurred in I nd-fn,itn>nal .Shoe Co. t\ 
Washington* where it was held there was 
jurisdiction over a nonresident party, not 
present within the territory of the forum; 
if that party had certain minimum contacts 
with the forum state, and if the mainte-
nance of the suit did not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice." It was further held there that 
the terms "present" or "presence" merely 
symbolize the activities of a corporate 
agent, within the forum state, which will 
be deemed to be sufficient to satisfy the 
demands of due process; that an estimate 
5. Iffi U.S. 7H, 24 L.Kd. 5415 <lh77). 
6. :rjo r.s. ;no, w set. IM, **> L.Ed. w 
(1JH5). 
UNION SKI COMPANY v. UNION PLASTICS CORPORATION Utah 1 2 6 3 
CitettMMNlMM l.WT 
of the inconvenience incurred by defending 
a suit away from one's home state is Rele-
vant ; that single or occasional acts of a 
corporate agent because of their nature 
and quality and the circumstances of their 
commission may be deemed sufficient $o 
render the coiporation liable to suit; that 
the satisfaction of the clue process require? 
ment depends upon the quality and nature 
of the activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws which tt 
was the purpose of the due process laws to 
ensure; that a corporation availing itself 
of the benefits and protections of the laws 
of the forum state, while accepting the 
privilege of engaging in activities therein, 
puts itself in a position where it may be 
made to respond to a suit to enfotce obli-
gations arising out of such activities—this 
can hardly be said to be contrary to com* 
inon notions of justice and fair play. 
International Sh&i* was the beginning of 
a trend, and in McGec r. International 
Life Insurante Co.,1 (which sustained the 
personal jurisdiction of California), the 
court, in commenting on this trend said: 
Looking back over this long history of 
litigation a trend is clearly discernible 
toward expanding the permissible scope 
of state jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations and other nonresidents. In part 
this is attributable to the fundamental 
transfoimation of our national economy 
over the years. Today many commercial 
transactions touch two or more States 
and may involve parties separated by 
the full continent. With this increasing 
nationalization of commerce has come a 
great increase in the amount of business 
conducted by mail across state lines. At 
the same time modern transportation and 
communication have made it much less 
burdensome for a party sued to defend 
himself in a State where he engages in 
economic activity. 
* * * * * * 
It is sufficient for purposes of due 
process that the suit was based on a con-
7. 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Kd.2d 223 
(1957). 
tract which had substantial connection 
with that State. 
That the trend begun in International 
Shoe does not countenance the removal of 
all restrictions on the acquisition of per-
sonal jurisdiction b> state courts is pointed 
out in Hanson r . Penekfa* where it was 
said that such restrictions amount to more 
than a guarantee of immunity from incon-
venient or distant litigation, they are, in 
fact, a consequence of territorial limitation 
on the power of the respective states. It 
was pointed out that minimal contacts are 
necessary, and the sufficiency of the mini-
mal contacts will vary with the quality and 
nature of the defendant's activity. Fur-
ther, that a defendant purposefully availing 
itsilf of the privilege of engaging in activ-
ities within the forum state, invokes the 
benefits ami protections of its laws. 
Itoth J M M V and Pemkla were single 
occurrence cases. In A7<(/«v a Texas in-
surance company solicited a California res-
ident, via mail, to purchase insurance; and 
the California resident accepted the offer, 
paid the premiums until his death, via mail. 
In Denckla, it was held that the Florida 
court did not acquire personal jurisdiction 
over a Delaware trustee to determine the 
validity of a trust established by a settlor, 
who while domiciled in Pennsylvania, exe-
cuted a trust in Delaware, and subsequent-
ly moved to Morula. Such was not an ac-
tivity of the quality and nature to establish 
minimal contact within Morida; nor was 
there an act by which defendant purpose-
fully availed itself of the privilege of en-
gaging in activities within the forum state, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections 
of its laws. Denckla draws the outer limit 
of state judicial power over a nonresident 
defendant. The activities of Plastics, in 
this matter} bear no relation to the limita-
tion of Pemkla. About the only similarity 
is each involves litigation, between a plain-
tiff and defendant. 
From the foregoing it can be seen that 
the evolution of the law controlling state 
8. 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 122S. 2 L.Kd^d 
1263 (1958). 
1 2 6 4 Utah 548 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
judicial power, over nonresident defend-
ants, has evolved to accommodate changing 
conditions. This evolution shows accept-
ance and then abandonment of "consent," 
"doing business/* and "presence/* as con-
ceptual determinants of state judicial pow-
er over foreign corporations. 
As was said in Foreign Study League v. 
Hollanii-America Line9 cases of this na* 
ture are strictly factual and are disposed 
of by the application of case and statutory 
law of the fact situation presented. A re-
view of the undisputed facts is helpful. 
A contract was executed, $25,<K)o was 
paid by Ski to Plastics; Plastics* agent 
Conducted activities within this State to 
promote the sale of its product. These ac-
tivities were in aid of the contract, which 
contemplated a series of long-term commit-
ments, and payment of further substantial 
sums. The commitments to be performed 
in Utah were a sine qua non of the con-
tract. Pursuant to the contract, Ski se-
cured orders, within the state of Utah and 
elsewhere; in the amount of $2l8,(NK), for 
the purchase of Plastics' product. 
From the foregoing, we can see that 
Plastics purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of acting within the state of 
Utah; thereby causing a consequence, with 
a substantial connection, in this State. It 
is further evident that Svi's claim arose 
from the activities of Plastics here. In ad-
dition, it is apparent that the acts of Plas-
tics and the consequence caused by Plastics 
had a substantial connection to this St.tte; 
a connection, which created contacts within 
this State, and makes the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of this State over Plastics 
reasonable. It cannot be doubted th.a this 
State has an interest in such activities, and 
in the protection of its citizens, from harm 
suffered because of such activities.10 
t . 27 Utah 2d 442. 443, 407 P.2<1 244 (1072), 
• 0. Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indus-
trie* Inc.. C.A.Oth liKW, 401 *\2*i 374. 
A state case illuminating here is that of 
Knight r. District Court of the 17th Judi-
cial District, County of Adams, State of 
Colorado.*1 There a Colorado bank 
brought an action in Colorado, on a prom-
issory note, against two citizens of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, serving the petitioners in 
Utah. The action was brought under a 
1<nig-artti statute similar to our own. The 
petitioners b.ul personally ap|K.\tred in Colo-
rado to borrow the money. Thereafter a 
renewal note was executed by petitioners 
in Salt I^ike City, and sent by mail to the 
bank in Colorado. The claim of petition-
ers was the Colorado bank did not have 
jurisdiction over their persons. Among 
other things the court said : 
. . . though the "last act/* such as 
the signing of a contract, for example, 
may have occurred outside the geograph-
ical confines of the forum state, never-
theless the statutory test of a claim aris-
ing out ot the transaction of any busi-
ness within the state may still be met by 
the showing of other "purposeful ac ts / ' 
performed within the forum state by the 
defendant in relation to the contract, 
even though such acts were preliminary, 
or even subsequent, to the execution of 
the contract itself. So, in the instant 
case, though the petitioners admittedly 
executed the renewal note in Utah, they 
had each nonetheless performed in Colo-
rado several "purposeful" acts relative 
thereto. . . . it seems to us to be em-
inently fair and just to require the peti-
tioners, who were able to come over the 
mountain to borrow $30,1)00, to return 
when they are allegedly in default as 
concerns repayment of the loan. 
In the instant matter, the mountain is a 
different one, but the principle is the same. 
Traditional itotions of justice and fair play 
require Plastics to return and respond to 
the allegations of Ski, 
II . 162 Colo. 14, 424 i\2d 110 (1967). 
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ELLETT, Justice: 
This lawsuit was initiated by Mr, Adams 
for the return of a boat and personal prop-
erty and damages for the alleged wrongful 
taking and detention thereof. There is no 
claim of right for the taking and detention, 
if any, of personal property other than the 
!»oat. 
The issue involved herein is the validity 
of a financing statement given to the ap-
pellant bank by the manufacturer of the 
l>oat which described it as a "Seaflite 
22()U Offshore # D.M.F.A. <K)82 M-75L." 
The actual number of the boat is D.M.F.A. 
0082 M-74L. The underscored numerals 
indicate the year during which the boat 
was manufactured. The serial number and 
description of the engine in the boat is 
correctly stated in the document. 
The trial court gave a partial summary 
judgment in favor of the respondent on 
the ground that the "Financing Statement 
. was defective and the defect was 
sufficient to defeat the bank's security in-
terest in the boat . . . ." 
The trial court was in error in holding 
that the figures showing the year of man-
ufacture invalidate d the statement. An 
cxcelU ut article by Professor Boyce is 
found in l°66 Utah Law Journal at page 
52 wherein the law is set out and cases 
cited. The article states: 
The description of the goods required 
to be contained in a security agreement 
need not be so exact as to provide the 
reader of the instrument with specific 
knowledge of the property or collateral 
imolved. The code provides that any 
description of personal property or real 
estate will be sufficient "whether or 
not it is specific if it reasonably iden-
tifies what is described. [70A-9-H0] 
Thus, the requirement that personal 
property in the form of goods be de-
scribed by serial number, or similar iden-
tification, is repudiated (i%6 opinion, 
Utah Attorney General, 31). 
The general law is also set out in (f) 
Amjur., Secured Transactions, Sec. 3^4: 
Since the Uniform Commercial Code 
merely requires only such description as 
is sufficient to identify reasonably what 
is described, whether or not it is specific, 
it follows that the courts generally take 
a liberal approach to descriptions set 
forth in a financing statement, particu-
larly where it is difficult to describe 
the property accurately. Accordingly, it 
follows that a court will overlook a fail-
ure to set forth a detailed description, 
including the serial number of the col-
lateral, in a financing statement. 
The partial summary judgment is re-
versed and the case is remanded to try the 
issues relating to the personal property 
other than the boat. Costs are awarded 
to the appellant. 
HENKIOD, C J., and CROCKETT, 
TUCKETT, and MAUGHAN, J).t concur. 
o J «IT «i>Htii mnw, 
CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Craig W. MECHAM and R. Kent Hello***, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 14423. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 24, 1970. 
Appeal was taken from judgment of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty* James S. Sawaya, J., which denied en-
forcement of Idaho judgments obtained 
against individual. The Supreme Court, 
Tuekett, J., held that individual who wa> 
officer of corporation located in Idaho, 
who gave guaranties to plaintiff to indem-
nify it against IOSM s which it might incur 
on accounts with the corporation, who made 
CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY v. MECHAM 
C i t e HM 5 5 0 P LM 1H*.» 
only one trip to Idaho and had no contacts agreement dated Octu! 
with any customer or supplier or lending 
institution during that trip, and who never 
asserted a business presence in Idaho was 
not subject to jurisdiction of Idaho court 
under Idaho long-arm statute. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed an 
opinion. 
Utah 183 
r *>, 1968. The 
District Court of Salt Lake County where 
the present action was filed entered judg-
ment in favur of the defendant Mccham 
and the plaintiff appeals. 
Courts C=»I2(2) 
Individual who had signed guaranties 
for the purpose of indemnifying company 
against losses which it might incur on ac-
counts with corporation, located in Idaho, 
of wroth individual was an officer at the 
time, who had always been a resident of 
t'tah, who made one trip to Idaho but had 
no contacts with any customer, supplier or 
(ending institution on that trip, who never 
asserted a business prestnce in Idaho and 
had no business address there, and who 
never consummated a business transaction 
in Idaho as an individual was not subject 
ko jurisdiction, of Idaho court under Idaho 
long-arm statute with respect to the guar-
anties, which were not entered into in Ida-
ho and which did not state that they were 
to be performed in Idaho. 
Leonard J. Lewis and E. Craig Smay, 
of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCar-
thy, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel-
lant. 
Frank J. Allen, of Clyde & Pratt, Ronald 
N. Boyce, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
and respondents. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The plaintiff is here suing on a judg-
ment entered against the defendant 
Mccham on February 13, 1975, in the Sev-
enth Judicial District Court of the state of 
Idaho. The action of the plaintiff in the 
Idaho court was in two counts, the first be-
ing on a guaranty agreement dated July 31, 
1968. The second count consisted of an 
assigned cause of action by the Bank of 
Salt Lake to the plaintiff of a guaranty 
The two guaranty agieenieuts were given 
to the plaintiff for the pur|>osc of indemni-
fying it against losses it might incur on 
its accounts with Great Basin Grain Com-
pany, Inc., located at Tetonia, Idaho. The 
case went to trial in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County. That court made find-
ings of fact which are not challenged on 
appeal. Among other things the court 
fouiK that the plaintiff corporation was a 
Delaware corporation doing business in 
California, Oregon, Idaho, and Utah; and 
that .he defendant Mechani has always 
been a resident of the state of Utah. The 
court further found that Mecham was an 
officer of the Gicat Basin Grain Company, 
from ts formation until April, l°70, when 
he disissociated himself from the corpora-
tion a id the plaintiff was so advised. The 
action in Idaho was brought against the 
defem ant Mecham as an individual. As an 
officei of Great Basin, Mechani made one 
trip to Idaho but he had no contacts with 
any customer, or supplier, or lending insti-
tution but discussed with the defendant 
Ileileson, president of Great Basin Grain, 
only internal affairs of the company. 
Mechani never asserted a business presence 
in Idaho and he had no business address 
in that state, i or did he have a telephone 
lifting. As an individual Mecham never 
Consummated a business transaction in Ida-
ho. The court fuitber found that the in-
struments sued upon in the Idaho action 
w«Te prepared »y the plaintiff in its Port-
land otfice and do not identify the state of 
hi tho as the place for performance. Me-
cham terminated said guaranty by notify-
ing the plaintiff at its Portland office. 
Mecham made a special appearance in the 
Idaho proceedings to challenge the juris-
diction of that court, but nevertheless judg-
ment was entered against him. The court 
further found that in respect to count two 
of the complaint filed in Idaho, the guaran-
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ty executed by Mecham to the Hank of Salt 
Lake was for the purpose of guaranteeing 
an obligation of (ireat Basin to the bank. 
The instrument was prepared in Salt Lake 
City by the Bank of Salt Lake and executed 
there. The Bank of Salt Lake assigned 
its claim to the plaintiff for suit. 
Jurisdiction of the Idaho court was as-
serted over Mecham by reason of Idaho's 
long-arm statute. That statute is quite 
similar to the Utah long-arm statute as 
well as the statutes of a number of other 
states. In determining whether or not the 
court of the forum state has jurisdiction, 
certain standards and guidelines have been 
enunciated by the courts of the various 
jurisdictions. Those standards include the 
following guidelines: (1) The nature and 
quality of contacts in the forum state; (2) 
quantity of such contacts; (3) relationship 
of the cause to the contacts; (4) interest 
of the forum slate in providing a forum 
for its residents; (5) the convenience of 
the parties. The plaintiff in support of its 
claim that jurisdiction had been obtained 
over Mecham by the Idaho court relies 
heavily upon the case of Salter v. Lin^n} 
a decision of the United States District 
Court of Massachusetts wherein jurisdic-
tion was upheld. In that case the defendant 
had organized the corporation which later 
became bankrupt, and for which he had 
become a guarantor, as its agent or alter 
ego. That court found that the defendant 
hail organized, used, and controlled the 
bankrupt corporation for the sole purpose 
of carrying out his agreement with the 
bishop under which he was to receive 10 
per cent and the bishop (X) per cent of the 
profits of certain nursing homes. The 
facts in this case are entirely dissimilar. 
The identical problem we have here was 
before this court in the case of I an Kleeik 
Creamery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Prod-
ucts Company * w Inch was also a sun upon 
the judgment entered by an Idaho court. 
It is interesting to note that the "long-arm 
statute" was the same as that in force in 
Idaho at the time the action against 
I. 21M F.Hupp. RS2. 
Mecham was commenced in that state. The 
individual defendants in that case had far 
more contacts in the state of Idaho than 
did Mecham in this case. This court up-
held a decision of the trial court that the 
Idaho court had failed to obtain jurisdic-
tion over the individual defendants through 
its long-arm statute and concluded that the 
judgment entered in those proceedings 
was not entitled to full faith and credit in 
the state of Utah. 
The record in this case supports the 
trial c o s t ' s finding that the acts of Me-
cham in the slate of Idaho were performed 
solely in his capacity as an officer of the 
Idaho corporation. We find no error in 
the record and the decision of the court be-
low is affirmed. 
HKNRIOD, C. J., and KLLETT and 
CROCK KTT, J J., concur. 
MAUOIIAN, Justice (dissenting): 
Reference is made to my dissents in 
Vn'mn Ski Co. r. I'nion Plasties Corp.. 548 
I\2d 1257 (Utah 1<>76), and Cate Rental 
Company, Inc., v. Whalcn cr Company
 t 549 
l \2d707 (Utah 1076). 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Emll Mart in SUNTER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14363. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May JM. ID7U. 
The Seventh Distriu Court, Carbon 
County, Edward Sheya, J., found defendant 
guilty of attempted burglary, and he ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, ) . , 
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